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Editor’s Note: As this comment was going to press, the Wyoming Supreme Court
published its decision in Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, overruling the aspect
of Watt v. Watt challenged by this comment. The author has provided a brief
addendum, addressing Arnott, at the conclusion of this comment.
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I. Introduction
In most states, courts conduct a “best interests of the child” analysis when the
custodial parent seeks to relocate with a child.1 Alone, a custodial parent’s move
is not enough to allow Wyoming courts to consider a child’s best interests.2 Love
v. Love exemplifies a strong policy favoring the relocation of the custodial parent
with a child.3 In Wyoming, a child’s interest in maintaining a relationship with
the non-custodial parent is rarely, if ever, considered.4 Legal practitioners have
searched for the meaning of Love for nearly twenty years.5 The Wyoming Supreme
Court has had difficulty explaining Love, thus complicating the doctrine.6
Wyoming law disregards the interests of the non-custodial parent and the
child.7 Hypothetically, under current Wyoming law, a custodial parent can move
with a child from Wyoming to the southern-most tip of Florida, without a court
considering the best interests of the child.8 Each day the application of this
doctrine continues, Wyoming’s children are moved across the country without
a consideration of their best interests, possibly diminishing or destroying their
relationship with an active and loving non-custodial parent.9
1
See infra note 121; see generally Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law: Numbers of Disputes Increase, 45 Fam. L.Q. 443, 470–71 (2012) (stating, “[g]enerally the
[custodial] parent wishing to move [with the child] must establish by a preponderance of evidence
that relocation is in children’s best interests . . .”).
2
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20–2–204(b) (2012) (noting that the parent petitioning the court
for modification of the current child custody order must prove there has been a substantial change
in circumstances before the court can conduct a best interests analysis) (emphasis added); Love v.
Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993).

Love, 851 P.2d 1283; see generally David M. Cotter, Oh, The Places You’ll (Possibly) Go!
Recent Case Law on Relocation of the Custodial Parent, 16 Divorce Litig. 152 (2004) (discussing the
complexity of custodial parent relocation disputes and declaring Wyoming law by stating in Watt,
the Wyoming’s Supreme Court “has gone to the extreme and has found that a parent’s constitutional
right to travel may actually serve to trump the best interests of a child in a relocation case”).
3

4

See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

5

See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 143 (Colo. 2005) (rejecting Wyoming’s approach
in Watt); see Cotter, supra note 3, at 152 (commenting in reference to Watt that “one court has gone
to the other extreme and has found that a parent’s constitutional right to travel may actually serve
to trump the best interests of a child in a relocation case”).
7

Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 616–17 (Wyo. 1999) (“The custodial parent’s right to move
with the children is constitutionally protected, and a court may not order a change in custody based
upon that circumstance alone.”).
8

See Linda D. Elrod, National and International Momentum Builds for More Child Focus in
Relocation Disputes, 44 Fam. L.Q. 341, n.4 (2010) [hereinafter National Momentum] (citing William
G. Austin & Jonathan W. Gould, Exploring Three Functions in Child Custody Evaluation for the
Relocation Case: Prediction, Investigation, and Making Recommendations for a Long-Distance Parenting
Plan, 3 J. Child Custody 63, 99 (2006)) (commenting that “long distances leave a child outside the
‘dynamic sphere of influence’ of the absent parent, changing the nature of their relationship”).
9
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State legislative and judicial policies favoring relocation of the custodial
parent with a child are often based on the parent’s constitutional right to travel,
deference to the trial court’s initial custody order, and a preference for a child’s
continued relationship with the primary residential parent.10 This approach
supports a custodial parent’s freedom to move.11 Even though this is the strongest
argument for Wyoming’s current doctrine, its application forecloses a best interests
determination in cases where the custodial parent is moving for any reason—even
if spiteful. Rigid legal doctrine should not foreclose a fact-specific best interests
analysis.12 Wyoming must eliminate the presumption favoring the relocation of
custodial parents without a consideration of a child’s best interests. Therefore,
Wyoming needs to give up on Love and focus on the best interests of the child.
This comment begins by introducing the various interests and rights crucial
in analyzing whether to modify a custody order when a custodial parent relocates
with a child.13 The background discusses the two main methodologies courts
consider in determining whether the relocation of the custodial parent warrants
a child custody modification, which include relocation as a typical modification
and relocation as a separate legal doctrine.14 The background further presents
Wyoming’s jurisprudence regarding relocation of the custodial parent with a
child.15 Next, the background describes the three main approaches and their
reasoning.16 The three approaches are: (1) a presumption favoring relocation of
the custodial parent; (2) a presumption against the relocation of the custodial
parent; and (3) no relocation presumption focusing first on conducting a best
interests of the child analysis.17 This comment argues Wyoming’s legislature or
Wyoming’s Supreme Court should change the state’s current law to focus on the
best interests of Wyoming’s children.18 Conducting a best interests analysis before
the potential relocation of the custodial parent with a child would best serve the
citizens of Wyoming and their children.19
10

See infra notes 131–40 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 131–45 and accompanying text.

Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wyo. 1993) (“Cases involving relocation of parents are
fact sensitive; we would be remiss to attempt to define a bright line test for their determination.”);
see Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 740 (1996) (“[I]t serves neither the interests of the children
nor the ends of justice to view relocation cases through prisms of presumptions and threshold
tests . . . .”); see generally Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict
Custody Cases, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 495, 515–16 (2001) (characterizing relocation of the
custodial parent cases as “fact sensitive and [lacking] uniform standards”).
12

13

See infra notes 22–59 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 60–76 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 126–63 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 126–63 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 164–97 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 164–97 and accompanying text.
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II. Background
A. Interests & Rights
Even absent the difficulties of parental relocation, child custody is an
emotionally charged area of law. When a custodial parent moves, it affects
important competing interests and rights.20 There is one legal doctrine and three
paramount interests that inform custody relocation law—the doctrine of res
judicata.21 The three interests are the custodial parent’s constitutional right to
travel, the non-custodial parent’s constitutional right to associate with his or her
child, and the child’s best interests.22 These competing interests make the law even
more emotionally charged and leave states with tough decisions regarding the
balancing of these interests and rights.23 All four considerations shape each state’s
approach to child custody modification law.24

1. Res Judicata & the Modification of Child Custody Orders
To modify a current custody order, a material and substantial change must
occur and must outweigh the societal interest in supporting the doctrine of
res judicata.25 Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated causes of
action.26 A current child custody order is a previously litigated cause of action.27
However, a showing of a material and substantial change in circumstances limits
the doctrine of res judicata and allows a court to revisit and modify the existing
child custody order pursuant to a child’s best interests.28 This limitation of res

20

See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142–43 (Colo. 2005).

Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 613 (Wyo. 1999) (“In seeking a modification of the custody
provision of the divorce decree, Mr. Watt assumed the burden of establishing that a material and
substantial change in circumstances had occurred, following the entry of the initial divorce decree,
which outweighed societal interests in supporting the doctrine of res judicata.”).
21

22
In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142 (“Thus, relocation disputes present courts with a
unique challenge: to promote the best interests of the child while affording protection equally between
a majority time parent’s right to travel and minority time parent’s right to parent.”) (emphasis added).
23

See infra notes 125–62 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 125–62 and accompanying text.

25

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204 (2012); Watt, 971 P.2d at 613.

Amoco Production Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Sweetwater, 55 P.3d 1246,
1249–50 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Eklund v. PRI Envtl. Inc., 25 P.3d 511 (Wyo. 2001)) (stating that
the following four factors determine whether res judicata applies: (1) identity of parties is the same;
(2) identity of subject matter is the same; (3) issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to subject matter and issues
between them).
26

27

See Aragon v. Aragon, 104 P.3d 756, 759–60 (Wyo. 2005).

28

DJG v. MAP, 883 P.2d 946, 947–48 (Wyo. 1994).
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judicata is due to a court’s parens patriae power.29 Some states value the effect of res
judicata more in relocation cases and require a heightened showing of substantial
change in circumstances.30 States requiring this increased showing want to honor
the previous child custody order as decided focusing on the interest of judicial
efficiency.31 Trial courts have wide discretion in determining what constitutes a
substantial change in circumstances.32 Wyoming case law provides guidance on
what constitutes a substantial change in circumstances in specific situations, such
as relocation.33

2. The U.S. & Wyoming Constitutional Standard: The Right
to Travel
The constitutional right to travel supports a custodial parent’s ability to relocate
with his or her child.34 In Shapiro v. Thompson the United States Supreme Court
articulated the constitutional standard regarding the interstate right to travel.35
Unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, any
state action restricting the right to travel to another state is unconstitutional.36

Linda D. Elrod, When Should Custody Orders Be Modified?: Flexibility Versus Stability, 26
Fam. Advoc. 40 (2004) (“Res judicata is more limited in child custody actions because of the
court’s inherent parens patriae power.”); see also Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to
Dependency Court, 79 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2001) (commenting parens patriae, meaning “parent
of the country,” is a doctrine derived from England chancery courts giving the court authority to
intervene to protect the country’s children); Naomi Cahn, State Representation of Children’s Interests,
40 Fam. L.Q. 109, 113 (2006) (“[T]he basic precept that the state can act to protect children
remains unquestioned . . . .”).
29

30
Watt, 971 P.2d at 613; see generally Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Prac. & Proc.
§ 17:28 n.2 (2012) (listing states that require a higher showing of substantial change in circumstances
in custodial parent relocation cases) [hereinafter Child Custody Practice & Procedure].
31
See Evans v. Evans, 530 S.E.2d 576, 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating relocation alone
is not a substantial change of circumstances permitting the reopening of a previous custody order);
see generally Child Custody Practice & Procedure, supra note 30 (listing states requiring a higher
showing of substantial change in circumstances in custodial parent relocation cases).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204 (2012) (providing that Wyoming’s statute governing
the modification of the previous child custody order permits a “best interests” analysis in a few
situations, including, but not limited to, a substantial change in circumstances); Watt, 971 P.2d at
613 (citing DJG, 883 P.2d at 947) (recognizing an abuse of discretion standard).
32

33

See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

Watt, 971 P.2d at 608–17; see generally David V. Chipman & Mindy M. Rush, The Necessity
of “Right to Travel” Analysis in Custodial Parent Relocation Cases, 10 Wyo. L. Rev. 267 (2010)
(explaining the importance of analyzing a custodial parent’s right to travel in custodial parent
relocation cases).
34

35
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974) (holding a constitutional right to travel exists within the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
36

Id.
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Wyoming applies the same standard as the United States Supreme Court for
evaluating decisions restricting the right to travel—whether the classification is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.37 In the context of a
custodial parent’s relocation, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted a relocationspecific doctrine.38 Watt v. Watt stands for the proposition that courts do not
restrict the custodial parent’s right to relocate by requiring them to prove the move
is in a child’s best interests.39 If the relocation of a custodial parent is within the
state of Wyoming, the correct analysis is under the Watt holding.40 If the proposed
relocation of a custodial parent is from Wyoming to another state, Watt seems to
control, but it is not clear exactly how Watt applies in interstate relocation cases.41
Functionally, Wyoming protects the custodial parent’s right to relocate by not
forcing the custodial parent to prove the move is in a child’s best interests.42

3. The U.S. & Wyoming Constitutional Standard: Raising
One’s Children
The United States Constitution does not provide the exact level of scrutiny
that should be applied regarding the right to raise one’s child.43 In Meyer v.
Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court enumerated a parent’s constitutional
right to raise his or her child.44 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court labeled a parent’s
right to the “care, custody, and management of [his/her] child” as a “fundamental
Id.; see Watt, 971 P.2d at 615 (finding the right to intrastate travel is a fundamental right
under Wyoming’s constitution); see also Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 53 (Wyo. 1992) (stating the
standard of review when a fundamental right is implicated is strict scrutiny and that Wyoming’s strict
scrutiny analysis is whether the alleged unconstitutional action is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest).
37

38

Watt, 971 P.2d at 608–17.

39

Id.

Id.; see generally Chipman & Rush, supra note 34 (explaining that the holding in Watt
recognized the intrastate right to travel).
40

41

Watt, 971 P.2d at 616. The court stated:
In light of our prior cases, and our concern for the protection of constitutional
liberties of the citizens of the State of Wyoming, we hold that an intrastate relocation
by a custodial parent, taking the children along, cannot by itself be considered a
change in circumstances sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the
question of custody.

Id. (emphasis added).
42
Id.; see Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 passim (Wyo. 1993); see also infra notes 77–120 and
accompanying text.
43
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing “with the
plurality that this Court’s recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing
of their children resolves this case[]” but that Justices Kennedy and Souter failed to enumerate the
correct standard of review, which Justice Thomas argued should be strict scrutiny).

262 U.S. 390, 400–03 (1923); see also Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (reiterating
the parents’ constitutional right to the “custody, care and nurture of the child”); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
44
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liberty interest.”45 More recently, in Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme
Court restated parents’ constitutional right to make decisions concerning the
“care, custody, and control of their children.”46
The Wyoming Supreme Court has also recognized a parent’s constitutional
right to raise his or her children under the Wyoming Constitution.47 The Court
recognized the United States Supreme Court has stated that “it is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”48
The Wyoming Supreme Court further recognized that governmental restrictions
on a parent’s constitutional right to raise his or her child receive strict scrutiny.49
First, the state must prove a compelling state interest justifying the restriction
on the parent’s right to raise his or her child.50 Second, assuming a compelling
state interest, such an interest must be achieved using the least intrusive means
possible.51 However, Wyoming courts have yet to specifically analyze the parents’
right to raise a child in the context of custodial parent relocation with a child.52

4. Wyoming Children’s Best Interests
Wyoming courts, except in the relocation context, give paramount
consideration to the welfare and needs of a child through a best interests analysis.53
Trial courts apply a best interests analysis through a factor based test pursuant to
Wyoming statutory factors.54 There are typically two situations in which a court
45

455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

530 U.S. at 66 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
46

47
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.”); KO v. LDH (In re MEO), 138 P.3d 1145, 1151–52 (Wyo. 2006) (citing
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 1995) (“[A] parent enjoys
a fundamental right to raise his [or her] children.”).
48

Hertzler, 900 P.2d at 1147.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 1148 (citing State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165 (Wyo. 1981)).

See generally Hanson v. Belveal, 280 P.3d 1186 (Wyo. 2012); Zupan v. Zupan, 230 P.3d
329 (Wyo. 2010); Inman v. Williams, 205 P.3d 185 (Wyo. 2009); Testerman v. Testerman, 193
P.3d 1141 (Wyo. 2008); Morris v. Morris, 170 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2007); TW v. BM, 134 P.3d 1262
(Wyo. 2006); Harshberger v. Harshberger, 117 P.3d 1244 (Wyo. 2005); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d
146 (Wyo. 1999); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo.
1995); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993).
52

Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251,
254 (Wyo. 1997)); Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1990).
53

Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 (2012) (the factors include:
the quality of the relationship each child has with each parent; the ability of each parent to provide
adequate care for each child throughout each period of responsibility; the relative competency and
54
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can reach a “best interests” analysis: (1) during an initial custody determination
(typically after granting a divorce or establishing parentage);55 and (2) during
modification of a current child custody order due to a substantial change in
circumstances.56 Wyoming’s statutory best interests standard allows trial courts to
use more than ten factors to determine a child’s best interests.57 Considering the
substantial deference given to trial courts in determining child custody matters,58
as long as the trial court discusses some factors and explains its decision, the trial
court’s determination will most likely withstand appeal.59

B. The Two Approaches to Relocation
Family law is the province of the states and not the federal government.60 This
freedom allows for a wide-array of approaches, but also creates a tension between
parents’ and children’s rights and interests.61 Each state applies its own method
to approve a relocation creating large discrepancies in decisions among the states.
Nevertheless, there are two main approaches states apply, each with various
intricacies and caveats—relocation as a typical modification and relocation as a
separate legal doctrine.62

fitness of each parent; each parent’s willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting; how the
parent and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with each other; how the
parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such interaction and
communication may be improved; the ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to
provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent’s rights and responsibilities; geographic
distance between the parents’ residences; the current physical and mental ability of each parent to
care for each child; and any other factors the court deems necessary and relevant).
55

See § 20-2-201.

56

See id. § 20-2-204.

§ 20-2-201 (the statute lists the ten factors as i–x under subsection (a). Subsections
following (a) remove factors from consideration, such as gender under subsection (c) or emphasize
the importance of other factors, such as spousal abuse under subsection (d)).
57

Rowan, 786 P.2d at 890 (citing Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1982)) (other
citations omitted) (“The decision of the trial court with respect to [custody] will not be disturbed by
this court unless we can identify a clear abuse of discretion.”); Gill v. Gill, 363 P.2d 86 passim (Wyo.
1961); Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 (1926).
58

59
Zupan v. Zupan, 230 P.3d 329, 333 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Hayzlett v. Hayzlett, 167 P.3d
639, 642 (Wyo. 2007)) (“In every case, the district court must base its child custody determination
in the best interests of the children using the factors enumerated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a).
No single factor is determinative.”); see also id. at 333–34 (quoting Pace v. Pace, 22 P.3d 861, 865
(Wyo. 2001)) (“The district court must articulate those ‘factors which were considered and how
those factors support its conclusions.’”).
60
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890)) (‘“[T]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”’).
61

See supra notes 34–59 and accompanying text.

This is an oversimplification of the survey of the laws of each state, but makes the doctrine
much more approachable. States have so many different presumptions, burdens, and tests that
62
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1. Relocation as a Typical Modification
Relocation as a typical modification maintains the modification analysis in
situations involving relocation using two steps: (1) proof of a substantial change in
circumstances, followed by (2) a best interests analysis.63 The crux of this analysis
is whether the relocation at issue is a substantial change in circumstances.64
New Mexico courts find nearly any relocation to be a substantial change in
circumstances.65 States sometimes intertwine presumptions into this analysis,
either favoring the relocating parent or favoring the non-custodial parent.66 State
courts and legislatures use these functional presumptions and burdens of proof
to further the interests the legislatures and courts consider most important.67 For
example, Wyoming’s policy favoring relocation of the custodial parent furthers
the freedom of the custodial parent by promoting a custodial parent’s right to
relocate with a child over an independent analysis of how a move may affect a
child’s best interests.68

a separation into two categories is helpful in grasping the big picture. See generally Fredman v.
Fredman, 960 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (illustrating the statutory approach used in
Florida relocation cases, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.13001: first, the relocating parent must
prove by a preponderance that the relocation is in the best interests of the child; after proving
that, the opposing parent must prove by a preponderance that the relocation is not in the best
interests of the child); Bodne v. Bodne, 588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003) (illustrating Georgia’s two-step
analysis in relocation cases. The person moving for modification must prove substantial change
in circumstances, then the court performs a best interests analysis); Chipman & Rush, supra note
34 (categorizing states’ different approaches to custodial parent relocation as being in one of five
categories: (1) an absolute right to travel; (2) pure balancing test; (3) best interests of the child
as a controlling state interest; (4) non-custodial parent’s right to visitation is controlling; and
(5) custodial parent’s right to travel not implicated).
63
See generally Smith v. Padolko, 955 A.2d 740 (Me. 2008) (illustrating Maine’s two-step
analysis in relocation cases, pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.19, § 1657: the person moving
for modification must prove a substantial change in circumstances, then the court performs a best
interests analysis).

Bodne, 588 S.E.2d at 729. In Bodne, the Georgia Supreme Court had previously held an
interstate move to not be a substantial change in circumstances alone. Id. The court overruled the
previous holding declaring an interstate move from Georgia to Alabama a substantial change in
circumstances. Id.
64

65
See Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 309 (N.M. 1991) (“In almost every case in which
the change in circumstances is occasioned by one parent’s proposed relocation, the proposed move
will establish the substantiality and materiality of the change.”).
66
See generally Kaiser v. Kaiser, 23 P.3d 278 (Okla. 2001) (illustrating application of the
statutory presumptive right to change the child’s residence); Barrett v. Alguire, 35 P.3d 1 (Alaska
2001) (illustrating application of a common law presumptive right to have a hearing on the best
interests of a child before allowing relocation).
67

See supra notes 125–62 and accompanying text.

See Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 613, 616 (focusing on the protection of the custodial
parent’s right to travel and the doctrine of res judicata). See generally Cotter, supra note 3 (stating that
Wyoming’s Supreme Court “has gone to the extreme and has found that a parent’s constitutional
right to travel may actually serve to trump the best interests of a child in a relocation case”).
68
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2. Relocation as a Separate Legal Doctrine
The separate legal doctrine approach to relocation typically involves a statute
separating the relocation of the custodial parent from the modification analysis.69
Under this approach, states will enact a statute that defines the legal analysis
applied when a custodial parent is relocating or planning to relocate.70 Typically,
a proposed interstate move or a proposed move of a certain distance triggers the
analysis.71 In Arizona, the custodial parent must petition for relocation before
the proposed move.72 Sometimes the statute requires a best interests analysis
before the custodial parent moves with a child, without requiring a showing of
substantial change of circumstances.73 Some statutes place a shifting burden of
proof beginning on the custodial parent or vice versa.74 The mere enactment of a
relocation-specific statute does not mean the state avoids the typical modification
analysis altogether.75 States find various ways to defend and further guarantee
certain rights and interests, often at the expense of others.76

C. Relocation of the Custodial Parent: Wyoming’s Doctrine
1. Foundation for Analysis: Love, Gurney, and Watt
Before Love, only one Wyoming case had addressed the issue of custodial
parent relocation with the child.77 In Love, by the terms of the divorce decree, the
mother was awarded primary physical custody of her two children.78 However,
the decree required the father’s consent if she moved more than 100 miles from
Sheridan, Wyoming.79 The mother petitioned the trial court to allow her to move

69
See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001(8) (West 2012) (creating a shifting burden of proof in
relocation cases); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408(B) (West 2012) (requiring advance written notice
for a move of 100 miles or a move to another state).
70

See § 25-408.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

See § 61.13001(8).

Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21 (West 2012); see also In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d
232 passim (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (illustrating the application of the relocation statute in the context
of a modification analysis).
75

76

See supra notes 22–76 and accompanying text; infra notes 153–76 and accompanying text.

See Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 323 (Wyo. 1990) (striking a provision from the divorce
decree that restricted the custodial parent’s residence to the confines of Laramie, Wyoming and
holding the restriction as being a “substitute for complete analysis of all existing circumstances”).
Notably, the Court did not discuss the constitutional right to travel, even though the appellant
raised the issue. See id. passim.
77

78

Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Wyo. 1993).

79

Id. at 1285.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol13/iss1/3

10

Larson: Watt's Love Got to Do with It: Relocating the Best Interests of W

2013

Comment

105

to Sioux Falls, South Dakota with both of her children, and the court granted the
petition.80 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
allowing the mother to move with her eleven year-old daughter, while awarding
the primary physical custody of the fifteen year-old son to the father because
the son wished to remain with his father in Sheridan.81 The court’s holding now
allows the custodial parent to move with a child as long as the reasons for the
move are legitimate, sincere, and in good faith; and if reasonable visitation is
possible for the noncustodial parent.82
In 1995, the court further elaborated on relocation of the custodial parent with
a child.83 In Gurney v. Gurney, the court awarded joint physical custody.84 However,
the parents encountered difficulties meeting the terms of the arrangement after
the mother moved from Torrington, Wyoming to Lusk, Wyoming.85 The trial
court found a substantial change in circumstances, which warranted a hearing
on the best interests of the child.86 The trial court found it in the daughter’s best
interests to live with her father.87 The mother appealed contending there had not
been a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of the initial
award of joint custody.88 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision by holding that the parties’ inability to communicate and agree was a
substantial change in circumstances.89 Even though the court further explained
and discussed the doctrine enumerated in Love, it did not address whether the
mother’s relocation was a substantial change in circumstances.90 The discussion
in Gurney has led to further confusion in applying Love because it is essentially
non-binding dictum, upon which Watt later relies.91
The seminal case in Wyoming regarding relocation of the custodial parent
with a child is Watt v. Watt.92 In Watt, the court initially awarded the mother
primary physical custody of her three children, with one caveat.93 Pursuant to
80

Id. at 1285–86.

81

Id. at 1291.

82

Id. at 1288–89.

83

See Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1995).

84

Id. at 53.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 53–54.

87

Id. at 54.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 54–56.

90

Id. at 53–56.

See id.; see also Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 614 (Wyo. 1999) (explicitly discussing Gurney
as an important elaboration on what constitutes a substantial change in circumstances).
91

92

971 P.2d 608.

93

Id. at 610.
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the divorce decree, if she moved fifty miles or more from Upton, Wyoming with
the children, the primary physical custody automatically vested in the children’s
father.94 The mother, planning to move, filed a petition to modify the divorce
decree and the trial court denied her petition awarding primary physical custody
to the father.95 The mother appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court, arguing
the lower court impermissibility infringed upon her constitutional right to travel
when it enforced the automatic custody change.96 In contrast to Martin, the
Watt court, addressing the constitutional issue, held “an intrastate relocation by
a custodial parent, taking the children along, cannot by itself be considered a
change in circumstances sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening
the question of custody.”97 Watt further explained:
Relocation as a substantial and material change in circumstances
was foreclosed by the decision in Love. Our decision established
a strong presumption in favor of the right of a custodial parent to
relocate with her children, assuming that the criteria articulated
in Love are satisfied. . . . Love and Gurney together capture a rule
that a relocation by a custodial parent, where the motivation
for the relocation is legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still
permits reasonable visitation by the non-custodial parent, is not
a substantial and material change in circumstances.98
This confusing articulation adds complexity to the foundation of legal analysis
because it describes Gurney as being as important as Love, even though Gurney
did not decide whether the mother’s relocation was a substantial change in
circumstances.99

2. Application of the Foundational Cases
Less than nine months after Watt, the Wyoming Supreme Court once more
addressed a relocation of the custodial parent with a child.100 In Resor v. Resor, the
trial court awarded the mother primary physical custody.101 The father appealed,
claiming the trial court should have made a determination of whether the mother’s
proposed move from Teton County, Wyoming to Seattle, Washington was in the

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 610–11.

97

Id. at 616; see also Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321 (Wyo. 1990)

98

Watt, 971 P.2d at 614.

99

See id.; Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 53–56 (Wyo. 1995).

100

Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1999).

101

Id. at 147–48.
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children’s best interests.102 The court held the trial court was precluded from telling
the mother where to live pursuant to Love and Watt, even though Resor involved
an initial custody determination when Love and Watt both involved modification
of a child custody order.103
Nearly six years after Resor, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided another
relocation of the custodial parent with a child case.104 In Harshberger v.
Harshberger, the mother had been awarded primary physical custody of the two
children pursuant to the divorce decree.105 The father petitioned to modify the
initial custody order seeking primary physical custody of the children, because
of the mother’s thirteen relocations throughout the state of Wyoming over the
course of five years.106 The trial court held there had been a substantial change
in circumstances since the time of the divorce decree, warranting a best interests
analysis.107 The trial court also found the mother inadequately supervised the
children, interfered with the father’s parental rights, failed to provide adequate
treatment for the youngest daughter until compelled by the court, and attempted
to emotionally manipulate the children against their father.108 The trial court
concluded it was in the children’s best interests to award their primary physical
custody to the father.109 The mother appealed arguing relocation of the custodial
parent with the children cannot constitute a substantial change in circumstances
by itself.110 The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with the mother, but held
the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding the mother failed the
Love requirements.111
Nearly every year after Harshberger, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided
cases on relocation of the custodial parent with a child relying on Love and Watt.112
Some cases involved initial child custody determinations,113 while others dealt with
102

Id. at 147.

103

Id. at 150 (discussing the application of Love and Watt in analyzing the initial custody order).

104

See Harshberger v. Harshberger, 117 P.3d 1244 (Wyo. 2005).

105

Id. at 1246.

106

Id. at 1246–47.

107

Id. at 1248.

108

Id. at 1247–48.

109

Id.

110

Id. 1246–48.

Id. at 1249 (“A review of our case law reveals that Mother’s characterization of our case law
is accurate as far as it goes, but she neglects a limitation and an exception to our teaching.”).
111

112
See, e.g., Hanson v. Belveal, 280 P.3d 1186 (Wyo. 2012); Zupan v. Zupan, 230 P.3d
329 (Wyo. 2010); Inman v. Williams, 205 P.3d 185, (Wyo. 2009); Testerman v. Testerman, 193
P.3d 1141 (Wyo. 2008); Morris v. Morris, 170 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2007); TW v. BM, 134 P.3d 1262
(Wyo. 2006).

See generally, e.g., Zupan, 230 P.3d 329 (involving an initial custody determination
removing relocation restriction from the divorce decree); Inman, 205 P.3d 185 (involving an initial
custody determination awarding custody to the father and ordering a $50,000 bond if father chose
113
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child custody modification.114 One case involved intrastate relocation,115 while the
others dealt with interstate relocation.116 Since Harshberger, most cases dealt with
custodial parent relocation restrictions in the divorce decree.117 The Wyoming
Supreme Court fails to discuss whether a custodial parent’s relocation with a
child can, in and of itself, be enough for a substantial change in circumstances.118
The myopic focus on protecting the custodial parent’s right to travel and lack of
discussion of the non-custodial parent’s right to raise his or her child continues.119
Love, Gurney, and Watt are the foundational cases to apply whenever a court
addresses: (1) restrictions on custodial parent relocation with the child within
the divorce decree; and (2) whether a proposed or actual relocation of the parent
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances warranting a hearing on the best
interests of a child.120

D. Getting to Best Interests: Wyoming Versus the Nation
Thirty-nine states allow courts to conduct a best interests of the child
analysis when considering the modification of a child custody order based on
the relocation of the custodial parent.121 Wyoming courts, however, require
to relocate out of the state); Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141 (involving an initial custody determination
awarding joint custody restricting the mother’s ability to relocate with her child to California).
See generally, e.g., Hanson, 280 P.3d 1186 (involving a father who petitioned to modify the
custody order due to the custodial parent relocation restriction in the divorce decree); Morris, 170
P.3d 86 (involving a father who petitioned to modify the custody order due to the mother’s frequent
relocation with the children); TW, 134 P.3d 1262 (involving a father who petitioned to modify the
custody order due to the mother’s frequent relocation with the child).
114

Zupan, 230 P.3d at 334 (discussing a divorce decree restriction preventing custodial parent
relocation with the child to anywhere outside the five-mile radius of Thermopolis, Wyoming).
115

116
See generally, e.g., Hanson, 280 P.3d 1186 (involving a mother who relocated with the child
from Wyoming to Idaho); Inman, 205 P.3d 185 (involving a father who proposed a relocation
with the child from Wyoming to South Carolina); Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141 (involving a mother
who proposed a relocation with the child from Wyoming to California); Morris, 170 P.3d 86
(involving a mother who relocated with the children from Wyoming to Kentucky and Washington);
TW, 134 P.3d 1262 (involving a mother who relocated with the child from Wyoming to Nevada
and Montana).

Initial custody determinations under the divorce decrees restricted the relocation of the
custodial parents with their children. See generally Hanson, 280 P.3d 1186; Zupan, 230 P.3d 329;
Inman, 205 P.3d 185; Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141.
117

See generally, e.g., Hanson, 280 P.3d 1186; Zupan, 230 P.3d 329; Inman, 205 P.3d 185;
Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141; Morris, 170 P.3d 86; TW, 134 P.3d 1262.
118

119

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 118.

120

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 118.

These states are: Alabama, see Ala. Code § 30-3-169.3 (2012); Alaska, see Barrett v. Alguire,
35 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001); Arizona, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408 (West 2012); California, see In
re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004); Colorado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10-129
(West 2012); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005); Connecticut, see Ireland v.
Ireland, 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998); Delaware, see Morrisey v. Morrisey, 45 A.3d 102 (Del. 2012);
Florida, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001 (West 2012); Georgia, see Bodne v. Bodne, 588 S.E.2d
728 (Ga. 2003); Hawaii, see Fisher v. Fisher, 137 P.3d 355 (Haw. 2006); Idaho, see Bartosz v. Jones,
121
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more than relocation before they consider the best interests of a child.122 After
the Love standard,123 subsequent Wyoming Supreme Court decisions further
complicated the doctrine.124 Other states, however, have explicitly overruled or
statutorily eliminated any presumptions when dealing with the relocation of the
custodial parent.125
197 P.3d 310 (Idaho 2008); Illinois, see In re Marriage of Dorfman, 956 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2011); Indiana, see Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252 (Ind. 2008); Kansas, see Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 23-3222 (West 2012); Kentucky, see Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008);
Lousiana, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12 (2012); Maine, see Me. Rev. Stat. tit, 19, § 1657
(2011); Maryland, see Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Massachusetts,
see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, § 30 (West 2012); Michigan, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 722.31 (West 2012); Minnesota, see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.175 (West 2012); Mississippi, see
Pearson v. Pearson, 11 So. 3d 178 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Missouri, see Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.377
(West 2012); Montana, see In re Marriage of Robison, 53 P.3d 1279 (Mont. 2002); Nebraska,
see Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70 (Neb. 2000); New Hampshire, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 461-A:12) (2012); New Jersey, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-2 (West 2012); New Mexico, see Jaramillo
v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991); New York, see Tropea v. Tropea, 655 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y.
1996); North Dakota, see Dunn v. Dunn, 775 N.W.2d 486 (N.D. 2009); Oklahoma, see Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 112.3 (West 2012); Oregon, see In re Marriage of Fedorov, 206 P.3d 1124 (Or.
Ct. App. 2009); Pennsylvania, see 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5337 (West 2012); Rhode Island, see
Westlake v. Westlake, 874 A.2d 200 (R.I. 2005); South Carolina, see Latimer v. Farmer, 602 S.E.2d
32 (S.C. 2004); Texas, see Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Utah, see Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-37 (West 2012); Vermont, see Hoover v. Hoover, 764 A.2d 1192 (Vt. 2000);
Virginia, see Sullivan v. Knick, 568 S.E.2d 430 (Va. Ct. App. 2002); and West Virginia, see W. Va.
Code Ann. § 48-9-403 (West 2012).
See Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993). In Love, pursuant to divorce decree, a mother
with primary physical custody petitioned the district court for permission to relocate from Sheridan,
Wyoming to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Id. at 1284–85. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed
her relocation with one of the children, creating a functionally irrebuttable presumption in favor
of relocation. See id. at 1286–91; see also Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 passim (Wyo. 1999) (applying
Love and practically foreclosing a “best interests of the child” analysis where modification is based
on relocation).
122

123
Love, 851 P.2d at 1288–89 (explaining the custodial parent will be allowed to move with
the child as long as the reasons for the move are legitimate, sincere, and in good faith; and reasonable
visitation is possible for the noncustodial parent).
124
See generally Hanson v. Belveal, 280 P.3d 1186 (Wyo. 2012) (discussing Watt and Love, but
holding on the decree restricting relocation, not on the actual relocation of the custodial parent);
Zupan, 230 P.3d 329 (discussing Watt and Love when the facts involved joint physical custody
and intrastate restriction); Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141 (discussing Watt and Love when the facts
involved an initial child custody order and intrastate restriction); Morris, 170 P.3d 86 (analyzing
Watt and Love, yet the relocation issue turned on the non-custodial parent’s repeated relocation);
TW, 134 P.3d 1262 (addressing Watt and Love, yet not finding anything in regard to the custodial
parent’s relocations and holding on other grounds); Harshberger v. Harshberger, 117 P.3d 1244
(Wyo. 2005) (viewing Watt and Love as restricting interstate relocation when facts were only
intrastate relocations); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1999) (discussing Watt and Love, custody
modification cases, extensively even though Resor dealt with an initial custody order); Watt, 971
P.2d 608 (making a strong statement of the relocating custodial parent’s right to travel, yet explicitly
limiting such right to intrastate relocation).
125
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10-129 (West 2012); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001
(West 2012). See generally In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005); Bodne v. Bodne,
588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
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E. The Presumptions and Underlying Policies
Presumptions are functional tools of law used to promote certain values
and make judicial decisions more consistent and predictable.126 State courts
and legislatures use rebuttable presumptions placing the burden of proof on a
particular parent to best effectuate the state’s underlying policy.127 States have
approached the relocation of the custodial parent in three different ways:
(1) presumption favoring relocation of the custodial parent; (2) presumption
against the relocation of the custodial parent; and (3) a best interests of the child
analysis. Relocation cases are “balancing acts [placing] one parent’s upward mobil
ity versus the other’s continuing contact with the child.”128 “Cases involving the
relocation of a custodial parent ‘present some of the knottiest and most disturbing
problems that our courts are called upon to resolve.’”129 One parent’s opportunity
for a new life is countered by the other parent’s interest in continuing a meaningful parental relationship, leaving a child in the middle of a very emotionallycharged domestic battle.130 This section describes the policies behind each of the
three methods.

1. Presumption for Relocation of the Custodial Parent
Presumptions allowing for relocation of the custodial parent are based on the
parent’s right to travel,131 deference to the trial court’s initial custody order,132 and
preference for a child’s relationship with the custodial parent.133

126

National Momentum, supra note 9, at 355 (quoting Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151).

127

See infra notes 131–52 and accompanying text.

Sarah Gottfried, Virtual Visitation: The Wave of the Future in Communication Between
Children and Non-Custodial Parents in Relocation Cases, 36 Fam. L.Q. 475, 476 n.14 (2002).
128

129
125 Am. Jur. Proof
(other citation omitted).
130

of

Facts 3d 495 § 1 (2012) (quoting Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 148)

National Momentum, supra note 9, at 341.

See generally Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999) (establishing that a custodial parent’s
right to travel is paramount to the other interests involved); Chipman & Rush, supra note 34
(explaining the importance of analyzing a custodial parent’s right to travel in custodial parent
relocation cases).
131

132
Jarica L. Hudspeth, Stills v. Stills: A Perplexing Response to the Effect of Relocation on Child
Custody, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 781, 790 (2011) (citing Judith S Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or
Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce,
30 Fam. L.Q. 305, 311–312 (1996)); see Chipman & Rush, supra note 34, at 267 (stating the Watt
Court explicitly recognized the best interests of the child analysis had already occurred during the
initial custody decision).
133

Gottfried, supra note 128, at n.40.
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Like Humpty Dumpty, a family, once broken by divorce, cannot
be put back together in precisely the same way. The relationship
between the parents and the children is necessarily different after
a divorce and, accordingly, it may be unrealistic in some cases
to try to preserve the noncustodial parent’s accustomed close
involvement in the children’s everyday life at the expense of the
custodial parent’s efforts to start a new life or to form a new
family unit.134
This rationale is often used to illustrate the main argument for the relocation
presumption. At least one study has concluded that the relationship between a
child and the custodial parent is the most important factor in determining a child’s
best interests.135 As compelling as the science and policies are, this presumption
often blocks a court from reaching a best interests analysis to the detriment of
a child.136
Custodial mothers are head of the household for more than ninety percent of
children of divorce.137 Of those mothers, seventy-five percent will relocate at least
once, over half of which will do so again.138 Considering these statistics, if a state
does not favor the relocation of the custodial parent with a child, there are many
parents, primarily mothers, who have their freedom restricted by the court’s power
to change custody under a best interests analysis.139 If the custodial parent can find
a better job or a cheaper cost of living, it may seem, on its face, advantageous for a
child to move with the custodial parent.140 In certain situations, a presumption for
relocation may be in the best interests of a child. However, if the custodial parent
is truly moving for a spiteful reason, this presumption allows the parent to move
and sever the relationship between a child and the non-custodial parent.

134

Tropea, 655 N.E.2d at 151 (N.Y. 1996).

135

Hudspeth, supra note 132, at n.59.

See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text; see also In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d
135, 145–46 (Colo. 2005). The Ciesluk court stated:
136

Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.
113 P.3d at 146 (quoting Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 307 (N.M. 1991)).
137

Gottfried, supra note 128, at 475–76.

138

Id.

139

See id.

140

Hudspeth, supra note 132, at 789.
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Some legal scholars anticipate a trend toward allowing more relocation based
on today’s technological capabilities.141 If both parents possess communication
technologies like Skype, the noncustodial parent can still have regular interaction
with a child.142 Technology is a very important tool the custodial parent can use
to his or her advantage. “In a mobile society—with cross-country and even
international relocations being prompted by changing economic circumstances,
family needs, remarriage, or health concerns—relocation requests are inevitable.”143
Technology is beginning to play a crucial role in determinations favoring
relocation.144 Virtual visitation “will give both [custodial and non-custodial]
parents the opportunity not only to speak to children, but to see them as well.”145
This technology can further a traditional court’s belief that the best interests of a
child are served by remaining with the primary caregiver.

2. Presumption Against Relocation of the Custodial Parent
Presumptions against the relocation of the custodial parent focus on the
noncustodial parent’s right to raise his or her children.146 Studies have shown
it is very important a child maintains a strong relationship with both parents
after a divorce.147 This presumption places the burden on the custodial parent to
justify the relocation.148 For example, the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute
specifically protecting the noncustodial parent’s relationship with a child, much
to the detriment of the custodial parent’s ability to move with a child.149 Under
this act, the custodial parent bears the burden of proving the move is in the
best interests of a child.150 The statute directs the trial court to consider sixteen
141
Gottfried, supra note 128, at 475; see generally Elisabeth Bach-Van Horn, Virtual Visitation:
Are Webcams Being Used as an Excuse to Allow Relocation?, 21 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 171 (2008)
(breaking down how virtual visitation methods are affecting custodial parent relocation cases, as well
as explaining how statutes address virtual visitation).
142

Gottfried, supra note 128, at 477; see generally Bach-Van Horn, supra note 141 at 171.

Ruth Sovronsky, The Relocation Dilemma: In Search of “Best Interests,” 75 Alb. L. Rev.
1075, 1075 (2011–2012).
143

Gottfried, supra note 128, at 477 (citing McCoy v. McCoy, 764 A.2d 449 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001)) (involving a trial court finding that the mother’s virtual visitation proposal was
“creative and innovative”); see Bach-Van Horn, supra note 141, at 171.
144

145
Gottfried, supra note 128, at 485. “Virtual visitation involves using tools such as videoconferencing, web-cams and other wired technologies to supplement face-to-face visits and courtordered phone contacts between a non-custodial parent and a child.” Id. at 477–78.
146

Hudspeth, supra note 132, at 789.

Kelly Gibbons, The Ties That Bind: Why Texas Should Adopt a Presumption That Relocation
is Not in the Best Interests of the Child, 12 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 555, 579 (2006) (citing Richard
A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 Fam.
L.Q. 83 (2000)).
147

148

Hudspeth, supra note 132, at 787–90.

149

Ala. Code § 30-3-169.3 (2012) (entitled “Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Act”).

150

Id.
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enumerated factors along with any other factors the court considers material.151
Even though this statute acts as a presumption against relocation of the custodial
parent, the presumption is rebutted by proving the move is in the best interests of
a child.152

3. No Presumption: A Focus on the Best Interests of the Child
The New York Court of Appeals fluently articulated the case against all
presumptions in custodial parent relocation law.153 In Tropea, the court stated:
[I]t serves neither the interests of the children nor the ends of
justice to view relocation cases through prisms of presumptions
and threshold tests that artificially skew the analysis in favor of
one outcome or another. . . . [I]n all cases the courts should be
free to consider and give appropriate weight to all of the factors
that may be relevant . . . . 154
This quote illustrates the policy behind the current trend in the United States
regarding custodial parent relocation law.155 The trend “seems to be to abandon
presumptions and to adopt a ‘best interests of the child’ test that requires both
parents to prove that their position is in the child’s best interests.”156 Historically,
courts have not analyzed relocation issues through a children’s best interests lens.157
Approaching relocation cases with a best interests analysis is advantageous because
cases can each be determined on the merits.158 Courts can take into account the
facts and circumstances of each situation, assuring each child is getting a decision

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).

154

Id. at 151.

National Momentum, supra note 9, at 355; see Child Custody Practice & Procedure, supra
note 30, at n.5 (listing the majority-rule states that allow a hearing on a child’s best interests during
a proposed relocation); see also Linda D. Elrod, A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the
Child Emerges as the Standard in Relocation Cases, 3 J. Child Custody 29, 39–40 (2006) [hereinafter
Right Direction].
155

National Momentum, supra note 9, at 356 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001 (West 2012))
(other citations omitted). See also In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005) (citing
Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 83 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991)); Bodne v. Bodne, 588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003);
Latimer v. Farmer, 602 S.E.2d 32 (S.C. 2004); Right Direction, supra note 155, at 39–40.
156

157
National Momentum, supra note 9, at 350 (citing Janet L. Richards, Children’s Rights vs.
Parent’s Rights: A Proposed Solution to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 245,
254–55 (1999)) (proposing that courts and legislators should put the focus on the child’s best
interests instead of parents’ rights); see generally Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children:
It Is the Right Thing to Do, 27 Pace L. Rev. 869, 874–88 (2007) (discussing rights for children to
have lawyers in contested custody cases).
158

Hudspeth, supra note 132, at 792.
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based on his or her best interests.159 Even though a best interests approach requires
more fact-intensive cases to be heard,160 the no presumption approach allows for
a true determination of a child’s best interests.161 “[S]ome social scientists argue
that the pure best interest of the child analysis, devoid of any presumptions, is the
appropriate way to evaluate relocation disputes . . . .”162 There may be more time
and resources spent by courts making custody determinations, but focusing on a
child’s best interests is worth the extra time.163

III. Analysis
Wyoming must eliminate the presumption favoring relocation of the custodial
parent with a child so a child’s best interests are not subservient to either parent’s
interests. Wyoming’s current doctrine places the custodial parent’s rights above a
child’s best interests.164 The relocation of a custodial parent involves important
interests of both the parents and the child, and many states have found a more
appropriate balance than Wyoming’s approach.165 Essentially, many other states
view the custodial parent’s right to travel and the non-custodial parent’s right to
raise his or her children as interests that cancel each other out, focusing instead on
the best interests of a child.166
While there may be good reasons for avoiding a direct route to a best interests
analysis,167 courts should consider the ramifications of not considering a child’s
best interests during relocation of the custodial parent. This is not a contract case
in which examining a document within its “four corners” forecloses fact-specific
findings—it is a child who is affected by these determinations for the rest of his or
her life. Courts should not use presumptions promoting judicial economy when
examining a child’s best interests.168 The judicial time and resources spent under a
best interests approach, in the end, benefit society in general.
159

Id.

National Momentum, supra note 9, at 355 (quoting Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151
(N.Y. 1996)).
160

161

Hudspeth, supra note 132, at 792.

Id. (citing Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make
Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev.
297, 309 (2000)) (“[C]hildren benefit from extensive contact with both parents . . . .”).
162

163

See National Momentum, supra note 9, at 355 (quoting Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151).

See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 143 (Colo. 2005) (stating the Watt approach
ignores the rights of the noncustodial parent and the rights of the child to a relationship with the noncustodial parent).
164

165

See supra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.

See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142–43; Chipman & Rush, supra note 34,
at 273–76 (listing Colorado, New Mexico, Indiana, Maryland, and Florida as states that use a
balancing approach, essentially focusing on the best interests of the child).
166

167

See supra notes 131–52 and accompanying text.

168

See supra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.
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States that do not use presumptions in custodial parent relocation cases better
serve their children.169 Courts and legislatures have been proactive in adjusting
this area of law to fit their policies. Wyoming’s presumption has received critical
treatment from other states.170 Ultimately, each state may choose how to achieve
its own values, but Wyoming’s outdated doctrine ignores one of the paramount
considerations under Wyoming law in other contexts: a child’s best interests.171

A. States Setting an Example for Wyoming
In the relocation context, Colorado and Florida courts focus on a best interests
of the child analysis.172 The Georgia Supreme Court and the New Mexico Supreme
Court explicitly overruled a previous holding and declared out-of-state relocation
a substantial change in circumstances warranting a best interests analysis.173 As
state courts and legislatures decide to resolve the problems with a presumption
analysis, they are finding ways to get to a best interests analysis.

B. Wyoming Should Take Action: State Statute
The Wyoming Legislature should do something to protect the best interests
of our children. Adopting new legislation to change the current doctrine would
alleviate the need for the Wyoming Supreme Court to overrule precedent, and
would allow the citizens of Wyoming to decide the best approach for themselves
and their children. Similar to how Colorado amended its statute section 14-10131 in September of 2001, our state legislators should amend Wyoming Statute
section 20-2-204.174 The Colorado amendment was drafted specifically in
response to a Colorado Supreme Court ruling that established a presumption
favoring relocation of the custodial parent with a child.175
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10-129 (West 2012); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001
(West 2012); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 143; Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624, 632 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
169

See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 143 (determining the Watt approach ignores
the rights of the noncustodial parent); Braun, 750 A.2d at 632 (determining Wyoming is the only
jurisdiction elevating the custodial parent’s right to travel above all other rights); Cotter, supra note
3, at 152 (“[The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Watt,] has gone to the extreme and has found that
a parent’s constitutional right to travel may actually serve to trump the best interests of a child in a
relocation case.”).
170

171

See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.

See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10-129 (West 2012); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13001
(West 2012).
172

173
See generally Bodne v. Bodne, 588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d
299 (N.M. 1991).
174
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-10-129 (2012). See generally In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d
135 (elaborating on the construction of the amendment and relationship with previous Colorado
case law, which stood for a presumption favoring relocation of the custodial parent with the child).
175

In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 139.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

21

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 3

116

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

The Colorado legislature added a new portion to the statute specifically
addressing when a custodial parent intends to relocate to a “different geographical
area” with a child.176 Under the statute, “different geographical area” means “a
residence that substantially changes the geographical ties between the child and the
party.”177 If the custodial parent intends to relocate with a child and a substantial
change in circumstances has occurred, then each parent must prove custody with
them is in the best interests of a child using statutorily defined factors.178 Best interests
of a child is defined using eleven factors under Colorado Statute section 14-10124(1.5)(a) and nine factors under Colorado Statute section 14-10-129(2)(c).179
Pursuant to the state’s new legal framework for analyzing cases of custodial parent
relocation with a child, the Colorado Supreme Court overruled its holding in
In re Marriage of Francis, which established a presumption for relocation of the
custodial parent.180
To alleviate the difficulty and uncertainty of having courts define what constitutes
a “different geographical area” under the Colorado statute, the Wyoming Legislature could utilize some of the language of the Colorado statute and explicitly
define the distance triggering a hearing on best interests.181 Alternatively, the
Wyoming Legislature could model its trigger for a best interests analysis on the
Arizona statute.182 The Arizona statute defines how Arizona courts deal with the
relocation of a custodial parent with a child.183 The Arizona statute triggers a best
interest analysis when: (1) the custodial parent moves out of the state with the
child; or (2) the custodial parent moves 100 miles within the state of Arizona with
the child.184 The Wyoming Legislature can use this exact approach or modify the
approach as it sees fit.
Arizona and Colorado both use statutory systems that increase certainty
and allow for more fact-specific determinations of each state’s children’s best

176

Id. at 140; see § 14-10-129(2)(c).

177

§ 14-10-129(2)(c).

Id. The factors are: the reasons why the party wishes to relocate with the child; the
reason why the opposing party is objecting to the proposed relocation; the history and quality of
each party’s relationship with the child since any previous parenting time order; the educational
opportunities for the child at the existing location and at the proposed new location; the presence or
absence of extended family at the existing location and at the proposed new location; any advantages
of the child remaining with the primary caregiver; the anticipated impact of the move on the
child; whether the court will be able to fashion a reasonable parenting time schedule if the change
requested is permitted; and any other relevant factors bearing on the best interests of the child. Id.
178

179

In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140.

180

See In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996); see also § 14-10-129(2)(c).

181

§ 14-10-129(2)(c).

182

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408 (West 2012).

183

Id.

184

Id.
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interests.185 The Wyoming Legislature should mimic the Colorado and Arizona
process by amending its child custody modification statute.186 This is one way the
legislature may require the Wyoming judiciary to focus on what is most important
in these types of cases: our children’s best interests.

C. Wyoming Should Take Action: State Common Law
Another approach is for the Wyoming Supreme Court to overrule Watt
and Love holding a relocation, in and of itself, can be a substantial change in
cir
cumstances. However, the court is hesitant to overrule precedent due to
stare decisis.187 Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court can depart from
precedent when it is necessary “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice.”188 This is one of several ways the court can correct
confusion and injustice under Wyoming custodial relocation law and get to a best
interests analysis.
The Wyoming Supreme Court can also find a way around its holdings in Watt
and Love without necessarily overruling precedent. The Watt holding explicitly
states that it applies to “intrastate” relocation.189 Any discussion of interstate
relocation within Watt may only be non-binding dicta.190 Additionally, the
holding in Watt could be argued as narrowing the Love holding from an interstate
move to an intrastate move.191 The cases after Watt have readily distinguishable
facts based upon procedural posture and substantive factual differences.192 The
argument for changing the law without directly overruling precedent is viable
because Watt, Love, and the line of subsequent cases can be interpreted in
multiple ways.193
185

See id.; see also § 14-10-129.

186

§ 14-10-129; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-408.

Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345,
1353 (Wyo. 1992)); see also In re ANO, 136 P.3d 797, 799 (Wyo. 2006) (“When precedential
decisions are no longer workable, or are poorly reasoned, we should not feel compelled to follow precedent.”).
187

188

Goodrich, 908 P.2d at 420.

189

Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 616 (Wyo. 1999).

190

Id.

Id.; see generally Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993) (involving an interstate relocation
from Sheridan, Wyoming to Sioux Falls, South Dakota).
191

192
See generally Hanson v. Belveal, 280 P.3d 1186 (Wyo. 2012) (holding on the decree
restricting relocation, but not on an actual relocation); Zupan v. Zupan, 230 P.3d 329 (Wyo. 2010)
(involving joint physical custody and intrastate restriction); Testerman v. Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141
(Wyo. 2008) (involving an initial child custody order and intrastate restriction); Morris v. Morris,
170 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2007) (involving a noncustodial parent who moved as often as the custodial
parent); TW v. BM, 134 P.3d 1262 (Wyo. 2006); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1999)
(involving an initial child custody order).
193

See supra notes 77–120.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

23

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 3

118

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

Practically, the court could work through the case law without overruling
precedent and hold an interstate relocation, in and of itself, can be considered a
substantial change in circumstances. This is a logical way the court could decide
when to trigger a best interests analysis because it is doubtful the court would
create a certain mileage minimum to trigger a best interests analysis. An out-ofstate distinction would not be a perfect solution because cities are often close
to each other, yet across state borders. A move from Torrington, Wyoming to
Scottsbluff, Nebraska is only thirty-three miles. A thirty-three mile relocation
alone should not rise to a substantial change in circumstances requirement. Even
though not perfectly effective, the court could hold an interstate relocation, in
and of itself, is a substantial change in circumstances, thus allowing more trial
courts to consider whether the relocation of the custodial parent with a child is in
that child’s best interests.
Perhaps the easiest way for the court to fix the law with regard to relocation of
the custodial parent with a child is to create a threshold distance where reasonable
visitation is not possible for the noncustodial parent.194 In Love, the court held the
custodial parent will be allowed to move with a child as long as the reasons for the
move are legitimate, sincere, in good faith; and if reasonable visitation is possible
for the non-custodial parent.195 The court has not defined what would constitute
“unreasonable visitation.”196 The court can define what constitutes “unreasonable
visitation,” essentially forcing trial courts to perform a best interests analysis by
declaring that a move of a certain distance will not provide for a child’s reasonable
visitation with the noncustodial parent.
These are a few of the ways the Wyoming Supreme Court can fix the complex
and confusing process of applying Love, Gurney, and Watt.197 Wyoming’s law
regarding the relocation of the custodial parent with a child is out-of-date, ignores
a child’s best interests, and needs to be changed immediately.

IV. Conclusion
The law in Wyoming regarding relocation of the custodial parent needs
immediate change.198 Wyoming is foreclosing a best interests of the child analysis in
cases where the custodial parent may be irreparably harming a child’s relationship

194

See Love, 851 P.2d 1283.

195

Id. at 1288.

See generally Hanson, 280 P.3d 1186; Zupan, 230 P.3d 329; Inman v. Williams, 205 P.3d
185 (Wyo. 2009); Testerman, 193 P.3d 1141; Morris, 170 P.3d 86; TW, 134 P.3d 1262; Harshberger
v. Harshberger, 117 P.3d 1244 (Wyo. 2005); Resor, 987 P.2d 146; Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo.
1999); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1995).
196

197

See supra notes 188–96 and accompanying text.

198

See supra notes 1–19, 77–125, 153–97 and accompanying text.
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with the noncustodial parent.199 This foreclosure is often contrary to a child’s best
interests, and a child should be part of the decision to modify a child custody
order.200 A presumption favoring the relocation of a custodial parent or favoring
a change in primary custody during relocation of a custodial parent ignores the
heart of the issue: the best interests of a child.201 A rigid legal doctrine should not
bar trial courts from determining how the relocation will affect a child.202 Trial
courts should be free to use discretion when determining whether a move of a
certain distance, under certain circumstances, will be in the best interests of a
child.203 Wyoming can justify a best interests approach by understanding the right
to travel and the right to raise one’s children are interests that cancel each other
out; leaving the best interests of a child as paramount.204
Wyoming should change its law through statute or modification of case
law, much like other states have done.205 States have created statutes explicitly
overruling legal precedent with which legislatures and citizens disagreed.206
Appellate courts have explicitly overruled cases that complicate the doctrine and
move away from the best interests of their state’s children.207 Wyoming should
make a change by putting the best interests of its children before the interests of
judicial efficiency and tradition, while still protecting the constitutional rights of
Wyoming parents.
There is no reason to ignore a child’s best interests when the important
noncustodial parental relationship hangs in the balance. Love should be the basis
of a best interest analysis during a substantial relocation of the custodial parent.
Ironically, Love is the reason the best interests of a child and the rights of the noncustodial parent are disregarded in favor of the right of a custodial parent to travel.
With regard to custodial parent relocation law, Wyoming’s doctrine leaves other
states’ courts and legal scholars wondering Watt the heck we are doing here.208

199

See supra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

200

See supra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.

201

See supra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.

203

See supra notes 172–97 and accompanying text.

204

See supra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.

205

See supra notes 172–97 and accompanying text.

206

See supra notes 172–86 and accompanying text.

207

See supra notes 7, 173 and accompanying text.

208

See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
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Addendum: Arnott v. Arnott
Recently, in a landmark decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court overruled
Watt v. Watt.209 Wyoming trial courts are now allowed to consider a custodial
parent’s relocation, in and of itself, as a substantial change in circumstances
warranting consideration of a child’s best interests.210
In Arnott, the Wyoming Supreme Court discussed the competing interests
and rights 211 involved in custodial parent relocation cases and explained the Watt
court had misinterpreted Love v. Love, inappropriately “elevating the right to travel
over competing interests.”212 The Arnott court recognized unfavorable treatment
of the Watt opinion in multiple jurisdictions and declared its myopic focus on the
right to travel as “not [being] supported by [the court’s] earlier precedent.”213
By overruling Watt, the Wyoming Supreme Court changed the law in
Wyoming to best serve its citizens’ children.214 This comment suggests other
pathways the court could have taken, but primarily advocates for a substantively
identical result.215 This comment and the Arnott standard both focus on the
paramount consideration in Wyoming’s child custody decisions: the best interests
of the child.216 Thus, this comment agrees with the result in Arnott and applauds
the Wyoming Supreme Court for crafting the law to best serve the state’s citizens,
especially its children.

209
Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, No. S-12-0089, 2012 WL 6720889, at *21 (Wyo. Dec.
28, 2012) (“[W]e hereby overrule Watt.”); see also Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999).
210
Arnott, 2012 WL 6720889, at *21 (“With this decision, we explicitly recognize that a
relocation by the primary physical custodian, as well as ‘factors that are derivative of the relocation’ . . .
may constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant consideration of the best
interests of the children.”).
211
See id. at *15–17. The competing interests and rights are the custodial parent’s right to
travel, the noncustodial parent’s right to parent, the child’s right to family association, and the state’s
paramount concern: the best interests of the child. Id.

Id. at *20; see also id. at *9–12, 17 (discussing the Watt court’s interpretation of Love and
explaining the difference between the Love holding and the Watt interpretation).
212

213

Id. at *20.

214

See id.

215

See supra notes 1–19, 164–208 and accompanying text.

See Arnott, 2012 WL 6720889, at *16 (“[T]he state has a compelling interest in promoting
the best interests of the children.”); supra notes 1–19, 198–208 and accompanying text.
216
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